Election Anxiety - Part II

Perceiving Defeat

The perception (reality?) of an impending defeat for those Christian allies of Hizballah and the Syrians hasn't been hard to miss. Hizballah's August 2008 downing of a Lebanese Army helicopter and the [allegedly] cold-blooded murder of its pilot, Lt. Samer Hanna, by gunmen belonging to the militant group - followed by the unapologetic stance taken by the group's Christian frontman, Michel Aoun - grated on nerves already frayed by the group's violent invasion and occupation of Beirut, as well as its assault on the Mountain.

Meanwhile, Aoun's incessant broadsides against the Maronite Patriarch (recently evoking a threat of excommunication!) and the country's top Christian statesman, the President, are proving to be a relentless drag on his approval ratings within Christian circles.

Such categorical strategic mistakes are the stuff with which the General has built a reputation for shooting himself [and everyone around him] in the foot. Witness his recent break with the Metn electoral powerhouse of Michel el Murr - as predicted in our July 2008 composite post.

Perceptions aside, however, the electoral battle is far far from over.

The real accomplishment for Hizballah in the Doha Accords was not the accordance of Cabinet-level veto power (by May 2008, the International Tribunal was unstoppable - although the group may now be trying to fiddle with the MoU to be signed between the Lebanese state and the Tribunal), but in securing the annexation of Christian population centers such as Jezzine, Baabda, and Marjayoun to large swaths of "Hizballah territory".

This while the group managed to break off other Christian centers, such as Zogharta and Batroun (both in the North) from neighboring regions strongly supportive of the Future Movement and other March 14 parties. That gerrymandering with electoral districts provided them with a reasonable chance to overthrow the Cedar Revolution's parliamentary majority, contingent on Aoun's performance in such Christian districts as Zahleh, Beirut's 1st District, Aley, the Metn, Kesrouan, Jbeil, Batroun, and Koura.

In each of these districts factors such as the formation of Murr-M14 list [in the Metn]; the murder of Lt. Hanna [from Batroun]; the candidacy of Nayla Tueni , daughter of the murdered Gebran Tueni [in Beirut District 1's Aschrafieh]; the fielding of "independent pro-sovereignty" candidates by the President [in Jbeil and, potentially, Kesrouan] ; and lasting ill will from Hizballah's assault on the mountain [specifically, Aley] are weighing heavily on Aoun's chances of success.

And so new and worsening stories of violence, threats of violence, and threats through violence continue to emerge.

It is no coincidence when [pro-Syrian] AMAL leader, Nabih Berri, calls for the holding of elections over several days due to security concerns only days before partisans of his party rough up dozens. It is no coincidence when that call is echoed by FPM leader Michel Aoun. Aoun, by the way, went on to spell it out for those too slow to catch on: "The M14 group can't guarantee the safety of their partisans's mass participation in one day elections." The question of protecting them from who didn't need answering.

And speaking of coincidences ...

Despite the threats and the violence, however, there are indications that the elections will take place on June 7th, as scheduled. The presence of independent foreign observers and massive security deployments that day will [most likely] ensure that ballot stations are free of violence. Attempts by Hizballah's allies to arouse worries over voters' safety as they transit to and from those ballot stations - recall that the attacks against Feb 14th ralliers came as they were making their way back to their homes across the country - will [hopefully] be mitigated by the shorter distances to be travelled in each district.

And if you don't believe me just ask the Syrians, who have reportedly promised the French, Saudis, and Americans that the elections will go through ... and people say the Syrians still have influence in the country ... hmph!

Election Anxiety - Part I

Liars at Least

Earlier this week Al Akhbar, a Lebanese daily, published what it claimed was an interview with John Hannah, a former top aide of US Vice President Dick Cheney. News of the interview [especially given some of the more outrageous statements attributed to the interviewee] aroused a fair sense of suspicion among political and journalistic circles in the country. This suspicion was heightened given Al Akhbar's strong links to pro-Syrian/pro-Hizballah elements within [and without] Lebanon's intelligence community, and the paper's status as a prominent component of the pro-Syrian/pro-Hizballah machine in Lebanon.

In 2005, after the Cedar Revolution secured a pro-sovereignty parliamentary majority, and as the assassination campaign against the critics of Syria in Lebanon raged on, An Nahar, the country's leading newspaper and a bastion of the pro-sovereignty movement, became a central target. Two of its leading journalists, Samir Kassir and Gebran Tueni (an MP as well as owner/editor of the paper), were assassinated. Meanwhile, Al Akhbar offered journalists inflated salaries and bonuses to abandon the An Nahar organization. One had but to look east for the sources of these "poaching funds".

As the wiretapping controversy was unfolding earlier this year, Samir Geagea, leader of the Lebanese Forces (a leading M14 party), held a press conference in which he detailed the role played by wiretapping in the assassination of Tueni, as well as that of another pro-sovereignty MP, Antoine Ghanem. Geagea went on to describe how, on several occassions over the past 4 years, he would discover his telephone conversations reprinted verbatim on Al Akhbar's pages.

As such, the revelation that the interview purportedly conducted by Al Akhbar with Hannah was a complete fabrication comes as no surprise - but tell that to tayyar.org, the official website of the recently re-branded pro-Syrian/pro-Hizballah FPM, which prominently ran the fabricated Al Akhbar interview. In a real interview with NOWLebanon, Hannah declares:

... I have never in my life sat for an interview with anyone from al-Akhbar ... These lies were published with the clear intent of harming those forces in Lebanon that are struggling on behalf of the country's independence and sovereignty ... Lebanese independence and democracy has many enemies. I think these forces are also trying to take advantage of the fluid situation in Washington now with a new administration in place, still formulating its policies. People in the Middle East and in Lebanon are excited but also nervous and uncertain about what to expect. But for Lebanon, it must be said that the initial signals from the new administration are quite positive with supportive statements from both the President and the Secretary of State, and a total commitment to the international tribunal. That was very bad news for Lebanon's enemies.

In his NOWLebanon interview, Hannah hinted as to the motive of Al Akhbar's editors in printing the fabrication, linking it to anxiety in the pro-Syrian/pro-Hizballah camp ahead of the upcoming parliamentary elections. Writing last month, in the wake of the FPM campaign to discredit the President; his support for a pro-sovereignty agenda and parliamentary bloc; and any potential candidate that might act on that support, we highlighted the prospect for increased and intensified violence should Hizballah and Syria perceive an electoral defeat for their Christian allies.

Several days after that post was put up, Mohammad Teaini and Lufti Zeineddine received fatal injuries in beatings handed out to them, as well as dozens of other February 14th ralliers, by supporters of pro-Syrian groups in Lebanon. The attacks came in the wake of higher than expected turnout by Christian supporters of the pro-sovereignty movement, for that commemorative rally. In the predominantly Christian districts, where the upcoming electoral battles are expected to be "hot and heavy", bombs and grenades were discovered outside of the offices of M14 Christian parties. Earlier this week, in an incident harking back to the Syrian occupation, gunmen belonging to [the village idiot troupe known as] the Marada and the SSNP (of course), setup roadblocks and checkpoints along a stretch of road in northern Lebanon infamous for its Syrian moukhabarat checkpoint, and the car thefts, assaults, and disappearances that used to accompany it.

Under Pressure – Part III

Part I, Their Goodwill Our Blood, Part II, Part III

The proof is in the pudding.

In the first instance I can remember, and in response to the PFLP-GC rocket fire, Gen. Jean Qahwaji (the man chosen to take over position of Army Commander in the wake of Michel Suleiman’s ascension to the Presidency - and in the wake of the assassination of Gen. Francois el Hajj, the top commander in the “red line-crossing” Nahr el Bared operation) ordered the deployment of Lebanese Army special forces units south of the Litani.

Meanwhile, in another first that I can remember, the Army has announced that it will be conducting Hawker Hunter manoeuvres over the coming days. The news comes after Russia’s declaration that it intends to supply Lebanon with 10 MiG-29 aircraft, the usefulness of which resides in the Army’s increased ability to confront internal threats rather than external ones. For a nation stung by the sight of its troops having to manually drop bombs on militants in the Nahr el Bared campaign, and (more importantly) by the high death toll exerted on its fighting forces throughout that campaign, the link between this manifestation of our enhanced air capabilities and the threat of another confrontation with [Syrian-supplied] militants operating under the guise of the “Palestinian struggle” (i.e., the PFLP-GC) cannot be missed.

And while our new Army Commander (who was himself subjected to a hushed-up assassination attempt – attributed to militant elements linked to the Nahr el Bared campaign … ) has moved to spruce up the Army’s preparedness to confront any instability, his predecessor, President Michel Suleiman, has called on the Cabinet to move to confront the “instrument of influence” from which that instability could arise.

The President’s stances, both in Qatar and at home (with regards to the PFLP-GC), in the face of the gathering storm should be commended. As the International Tribunal becomes operational, as the threat of an electoral defeat begins to loom larger for Syria’s allies in Lebanon (measure that threat with the number and volume of rants by Aoun and his oranges – against the President – as the elections approach), and as Syria feels the need to demonstrate the fashion in which it exercises its influence to a new US administration, the dangers to this country will grow.

If we are to survive them, we must close ranks and recognize those who have taken steps to uphold our sovereignty, supporting them against those who would tear it down.

Under Pressure – Part II

Part I, Their Goodwill Our Blood, Part II, Part III

Despite its bloody tactics and relentless campaign, the regime in Syria has so far been denied in its efforts to stymie the establishment of the International Tribunal, while the survival of the [pre-Doha Accords] Cabinet and the Parliamentary majority throughout these campaigns of terror and intimidation meant that the Syrians were unable to spike the Lebanese state’s participation in the Tribunal’s investigations or organizational structure (for example, by forcing the Lebanese government to call for a majority Lebanese panel of judges and then forcing the selection of pro-Syrian Lebanese judges) .

And despite the imminence of the approaching storm, there is a sense that the majority of Lebanese will continue to insist on determining their own fate and extract their country from the clutch of regional entities intent on using Lebanese territory and lives in the pursuit of their interests.

In a development unprecedented since the end of the civil war (and the subsequent assassination of Rene Mouawad at Syria’s hands), there is a sense that we have a President interested in and capable of working to ensure that we can be a country at peace with our neighbour to the east while at the same time remaining sovereign and independent of that country’s regional ambitions.

This as the President continues to be subjected to intense pressure to “fall in line” with the Syrian stance, as accentuated by a recent leak citing a threat by some pro-Syrian groups to “pull their ministers out of government in case [the President] insisted on not going to Qatar.”

As the country’s parliamentary elections draw near the emergence of the President as a patient promoter of a pro-sovereignty agenda – divergent (in substance or style?) as it may be from that of the pro-sovereignty Cedar Revolution movement – will face the ultimate test. Already the prospect seems to have driven the rivals of the pro-sovereignty agenda into a veritable panic (cue rant by Michel Aoun or one of his lesser Aounites).

In the past that panic has translated into violence and disruption, as was the case in January 2007, after the Lebanese government officially requested the creation of the International Tribunal, as was the case in May 2008, after the Lebanese government instructed the military to transfer a General with close ties to Hizballah from his position overseeing the security and operations of the country’s international airport.

In January 2007 Hizballah was thwarted in its attempts to paralyse the country by its [FPM, SSNP, and Marada] allies’ inability to enforce roadblocks along the predominantly Christian coastal highway stretching from Tripoli to Beirut. Unsatisfied with the Army’s intervention (limited as it was) during that crisis along with Army Command’s complete rejection of the “Nasrallah Red Line” during the May 2007 Nahr el Bared offensive, the group moved in January 2008 to ensure that the Army’s hands would be tied in the next crisis, brought about in May 2008.

This time around, the situation may lend itself to a scenario in which the Army moves to take up its role as a defender of the nation and the state.

Under Pressure – Their Goodwill Our Blood

Part I, Their Goodwill Our Blood, Part II, Part III

But nothing ever happens the same way twice.

With the prospect of a return to Clinton-era diplomacy on the horizon, the Syrian regime must be banking on gaining more mileage out of the disruptive role its continues play in the region, and the tactics which it implemented throughout the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations that stretched on throughout the Clinton years.

At that time, peace was closer than it had ever been, and closer than it has ever been since. Slighted at having been sidestepped through the Oslo Accords, and intent on portraying itself as a regional player, the regime in Syria sought gain leverage in its own negotiations with Israel (and the US), and project an image of regional influence, by enabling Hamas and Islamic Jihad and activating their attacks at times when it was most hurtful and costly to the peace process and those pursuing it.

Today that option seems to have been neutralized with the effective end of an [excessively bloody] Israeli military campaign in Gaza which has rendered Hamas operationally defunct. Not only is the group now effectively cut off from its supply routes through Egypt, but the Gaza war has proved Hamas’ complete inability to mobilize any effective action against Israel emanating from the West Bank.

Which brings us back to Lebanon ...

... which was the scene of some “light” rocket fire into northern Israel (insert intense Israeli media commentary on the devastating effect on the mental well-being of farm animals affected by the rockets) attributed to another militant group, and instrument of Syrian “regional influence”, the PFLPL-GC.

Despite the “regional” connotations of the act, what this paltry attempt at launching rockets ended up reflecting was the operational constraints placed on any militant group operating in the region south of the Litani in the aftermath of UNSC Resolution 1701 and the presence of a 30,000-strong combined UNIFIL-Lebanese Army force mandated by that resolution. Indeed, Hizballah’s effective idleness, along with its attempts to move the theatre of supportive action for Hamas to Egypt, underlined that group’s own inability to act in the face of staunch resistance to the ignition of another conflict by the people most affected by it, the residents of the South. All this in the wake of the July War which, similarly to the most recent conflict, saw the group enter the fight as Hamas took a battering in Gaza.

With the Gaza card effectively diminished, and as the US renews its drive to push past the roadblocks and obstacles put up by the region’s radical movements (both on the Israeli side and along the Syrian-Iranian axis), the prospect of Lebanon being once again used as a Syrian-Iranian bargaining chip has intensified. And already, along with the sad proclamations of victory by Hamas, we now have proclamations by the Syrian regime that it is to them that the world owes a debt of gratitude for having kept our country out of war!

Under Pressure – Part I

Part I, Their Goodwill Our Blood, Part II, Part III

With parliamentary elections (June 7th 2009) and the International Tribunal’s operational starting date (March 1st 2009) fast approaching, Lebanon is entering a period of increased risk. For Syria, the stakes are too high to allow the continuation of the country’s pro-sovereignty drive, especially with the apparent addition of the country’s recently-elected President to the ranks of those working towards a strong, viable and sovereign state. As Syria begins to feel the pressure of an operational Tribunal (witnesses and all), along with a newly reinvigorated Arab Peace Initiative under the stewardship of an ambitious US-Middle East policy, so too will it bring pressure (of the explosive kind) to bear on those Lebanese it perceives as a hindrance to its dominance of the only piece of real-estate it ever really cared about, i.e. its tiny neighbor to the west.

Those following developments in Lebanon and the broader region should, by now, be no strangers to the tactics employed by the Syrian regime in order to coerce its way out of having to abide by the International Tribunal. For the most part, these tactics consist of a two-pronged approach: On the one hand, the costs to the Lebanese and the broader international community and those Lebanese who support the International Tribunal are dramatically increased through a series of destabilizing measures rendering the country unsuitable for business, life and any further international interest.

On the other hand, the regime works to ensure that its allies and proxies in Lebanon are strategically placed throughout the executive, legislative, and judicial bodies of the state [and its security apparatus], in order to prevent the execution of any decision emanating from that international court – a move, should it ever come to fruition [through this June’s elections], which would place us in direct confrontation with the broader international community and render unto the country and its citizens a global “pariah status”.

The two “prongs” have not been mutually exclusive, converging through such actions as the targeting and assassination of MPs and Ministers (cutting away at the pro-sovereignty two-thirds majority in Cabinet and simple majority in Parliament), the launching of the January 23rd 2007 riots and their culmination in the attacks started on May 7th 2008.

This week, reports emerged of approximately 150 militants being transferred across the Syrian border to bases controlled by proxies of the Syrian regime’s intelligence apparatus. The reports are especially worrying given the pattern such developments have taken in the past. Go back to May 2007 when the International Tribunal was activated and a string of terrorist attacks launched – including the Fatah al Islam insurgency in Nahr el Bared. Precede that with this report from late 2006, bringing news of 200 fighters being smuggled in from Syria. And finally, juxtapose it with the assassination of Walid Eido, a former judge and Future Movement MP thought to have been involved in the Lebanese government’s work on the drafting of the International Tribunal’s charter and mandate.

The "Elections Cabinet"

(Originally posted on Blacksmiths of Lebanon)

On the new Cabinet's operational and administrative effectiveness I won't comment. In the long/medium and even short-run it doesn't matter, all the progressive moves or gains that might be made in the next ten months can easily be erased in a day if a decision similar to that of July 2006 or May 2008 is taken [again, by Hizballah or their masters in Tehran, rather].

Instead, I want to take a brief look at those cabinet members fielded specifically in preparation for the 2009 parliamentary elections. The most prominent names that stand out in that regard are, of course, that of Ibrahim Shamseddine and Nassib Lahoud, both M14 affiliates.

On Nassib Lahoud and the political battle in the Metn, much has already been said on this blog, and much of that has already been corroborated by developments on the ground. While Murr and the Armenian Tashnaq party have renewed their vows to each other, we are still awaiting word on further developments. The naming of Jean Ogassapian, a Tashnaq rival, as a Minister of State, has highlighted the Future Movement's commitment to their Armenian allies in Beirut, but of Hashnaq's (to which Ogassapian belongs) ability to bring about a political victory, much remains uncertain. In any case, political shifts [and compromises] on that front certainly can't be ruled out until the elections are actually over.

Also unclear is whether Aoun will benefit from a tripartite electoral compromise in the Metn dividing seats and votes along M14 - M8 - Presidential lines. Meanwhile, the procuring of the Ministry of Agriculture to Aoun's erstwhile ally, Elias Skaff, and the Ministry of Tourism to the Kataeb's Elias Marouni points to a heated electoral battle in the Beqaa city of Zahleh from which both men hail, and where the battle may be more personal than political. Earlier this year, Marouni's brother and another Kataeb partisan were both gunned down by the Baath party-provided [i.e. Syrian provided] security men of Skaff.

Whether this incident, and the local outrage and hostilities generated by it, will be enough to overcome the favors sure to be doled out from the ministry Skaff has come to occupy in a region known as the heart of the country's farmland, remains to be seen. In either case, we can mark this Orangesque appointment down to Aoun's full-fledged participation in the country's favor-politics (a euphemism for corruption).

The Orange General's appointment of his inept son-in-law, Gebran Bassil, to the vital Telecommunications portfolio stinks of nepotism and should be seen in light of the General's [so far unsuccessful] attempts to name his blustering relative as the FPM's vice president, ahead of far brighter members. His running in the district of Batroun will pit him against the seasoned anti-Syrian parliamentarian, Butros Harb.

Aoun's other political appointment, Mario Aoun, carries with it the hallmarks of the 2005 elections and the political mud which netted 'Mario' an almost totality of Christian votes in the Chouf district. As it turned out, those votes were not enough to secure for the Aouns an electoral victory in a pre-dominantly Druze district, but it did underline Christian malcontent with the quadripartite alliance and, specifically in the Chouf, the electoral neglect paid [by Walid Jumblatt] to another original fighter against Syrian occupation, Dori Chamoun.

In that regard, Chamoun and Aoun have a lot in common. Both men are leaders of Christian movements which actively took part in the demonstrations and movements that ousted the Syrian occupiers throughout the Cedar Revolution; and both were sidelined by the political machinations which dominated those elections. But thats where the similarities end. Contrary to Aoun, who went on to cement his alliances with the SSNP, Hizballah, and all manner of Syrian thugs in his crusade to reach the Presidency, Chamoun remained within the Anti-Syrian alliance and continued to take positions in line with long-standing "Christian" stances.

Indeed, if March 14th is to successfully conduct its electoral battle on the Christian front, they must be willing to correct the mistakes of the previous election. Fielding two Lebanese Forces ministers, Ibrahim Najjar and Antoine Karam, was a move in the right direction, so was the naming of Nassib Lahoud (as representative of the Qornet Shehwan Gathering). Putting forward a list of candidates including those submitted by Chamoun (which would presumably include himself) in the Chouf, would go the extra mile in mobilizing the significant anti-Syrian Christian electoral bases in the Chouf, Baabda, and Aley: All Hizballah border regions that have witnessed their fair share of provocations and maneuvers by the group.

For its part, Hizballah has chosen to forsake its share of cabinet seats in favor of its allies. A particularly repugnant choice is Ali Qanso, former head of the SSNP. Aside from the [failed] argument put forward by Siniora to keep this man out of the Cabinet lineup (it didn't make sense to object to him based on his members' ransacking of Beirut while at the same time accepting Hizballah and AMAL in the Cabinet), it should be noted that Qanso, throughout his tenure at the SSNP presided over what essentially was a Syrian assassination cell, with little to do with the original philosophy (now long gone) attributed to the party.

His nomination, is perhaps meant to distract (unsuccessfully) from the nomination of another Shiite, this time by March 14, from outside of the two parties that have enforced a Syrian hegemony - and in the case of Hizballah, an Iranian Khomeiniest ideology - on the country's Shiites. That nomination is that of Ibrahim Shamseddine.

On the pros and cons of Shamseddine as a politician and/or administrator I won't bother to comment, he is yet unproven, but his nomination takes me back to some of the first posts I put up on this blog. Those posts dealt with the hegemony imposed on the Shiite community as enforced by AMAL and Hizballah, and the need to break it to allow the country's Shiites to be full participants in the democratic institutions of the state (no matter how much reform they currently need).

The promotion of Shamseddine [who was reportedly slated for the position of Information Minister before being blocked by Berri who thought the post would give him too much air time and publicity], along with the support given to Ahmad al Asaad (who will run in the Marjayoun + Hasbayya districts of the South) is a very important step in that direction.

It is a step frayed with dangers. Hizballah has in the past demonstrated how it deals with critics within its community and the recent stoning of the U.S. Ambassador (to-be's) convoy on its way to Shamseddine's residence in the South last month stands proof of its intentions to these men.

Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of the country's post-Syrian elections, so far, has been the absence of violence. In 2005, international pressure, monitoring, and will-to-act ensured that any attempts [by Syria or others] to cripple those elections through the use of terrorist acts would bring about severe reprecussions. As we near 2009, we can only hope that these pressures and will-to-act can provide us with the same, relatively calm, atmosphere conducive to any democratic process.

Link to original post and comments: Click here

Elect-Aoun-eering -- The Machine

Part I, Part II, Political Mud, The Machine

Reducing the entirety of the 2005 elections to duplicitous alliances and reactionary votes, however, overlooks the roll played by key players in key districts which led to the anti-Syrian majority being a simple majority instead of a two-thirds one, as would have been hoped.

In the Metn, the electoral loss of a pillar of the Cedar Revolution movement, Nassib Lahoud, underlined the delicate politics that dictate electioneering in the region, and the name that is the main driver of that electioneering: Murr. Specifically, in the case of the 2005 elections, as in the case of the run-off 2007 elections, that name is Gabriel el Murr...

...well, its really Michel el Murr, but his brother Gabriel, along with Michel’s son Elias, plays a central role in understanding the prime driver behind Michel’s manoeuvres. In his son’s case, one has but to refer to a tried and tested rule: neutral is not good enough. Not for the Syrian regime which continues to work to ensure that it has a say in the naming of every critical position in the country, and the behaviour of that official once he is in that position, just as was the case throughout that country’s occupation of Lebanon.

To the Syrians, Elias el Murr was considered a write-off (to use a euphemism) when he refused to “take an order” from the Syrian front-man in the country in 2004, Rustom Ghazali. The assassination attempt on Elias that followed in 2005, coming as it did among the wave of anti-Syrian assassinations, was considered a clearing of accounts by the regime and underlined, for the short run, the stance of the regime vis-a-vis the scion of the Murr family name.

And yet the Murrs, to date, are not a “March” name. While the assassination attempt ruled them out of March 8 status, the family itself would not thrust itself into the March 14 movement (as evidenced by the run-off election of 2007). The reason for that was the presence of long-time family rival, Gabriel el Murr, among the ranks of the March 14 precursor (and soon to be regenerated) alliance of Christian independents known as the Qornet Shehwan Gathering. Here I’d like to note that no less than three of the gathering’s members (Gebran Tueni, Pierre Gemayel, and Antoine Ghanem) have been the victims of assassinations organised/ordered by the Syrian regime.

The close relation between Nassib Lahoud and Gabriel el Murr, and the latter’s presence in the ranks of the March 14 movement (through the Qornet Shehwan Gathering) since its inception are the primary drivers for the group’s consistent losses [to Michel Aoun’s bloc] in the Metn over the past two elections - and nothing else.

Now two events seem to underline the fact that Michel Aoun certainly will not be the beneficiary of the Murr Metn electoral machine: Murr’s full swing into the budding parliamentary camp of the new President, Michel Suleiman [through his stance throughout the Presidential crisis]; and his swing into the same ministerial camp [through his son’s appointment to the Ministry of Defence – a position assigned from the President’s cabinet share]. Both of these positions broke, cleanly, with the Orange General who was a main obstructer of Suleiman’s election, and who has since gone on to obstruct the formation the first cabinet under the new President by giving voice to Hizballah [and therefore Syria and Iran’s] rejection of Elias el Murr’s nomination to the Ministry of Defence.

No, Aoun will definitely not be the beneficiary, but with no word on the fate of Gabriel el Murr (although the continued closure of his MTV despite the past three years, might provide a hint) within the March 14th movement, it is unclear whether they will be the final beneficiaries of the Murr machine either.

Certainly, the recent visit by Gabriel to the offices of the Armenian Tashnaq party – which continues to occupy the electoral spotlight after its bloc-vote in the Metn 2007 by-elections in Aoun’s favour (at the presumed behest of Michel el Murr) and its seat allocation in the Beirut electoral districting agreement of the Doha Accord – has added fuel to the fiery speculations of either Gabriel’s switch to the SSNP-Aoun voting lists or of Tashnaq’s break with Michel el Murr.

If history and political shrewdness are to be followed, the most probable scenario is likely to witness the emergence of a third, Presidential, faction of Christian candidates in which Murr, anxious to build ties with a President in place for the next six years, and the Armenians, who will most likely hedge their bets between Hariri in Beirut and the President in the Metn, will be leading participants.

Elect-Aoun-eering -- Political Mud

Part I, Part II, Political Mud, The Machine

With all the clarity, and righteousness of the fight to restore the country’s sovereignty and throw off the yolk of an increasingly unbearable Syrian occupation and political status quo, has come the mud of the sometimes necessary politics engaged in the pursuit of those goals. The quadripartite alliance stands as a primary symbol of that mud.

It should be conceded that the alliance did provide an electoral victory for the anti-Syrian movement directly following the withdrawal of Syria's military and intelligence apparatus from the country, in the presence of national institutions thoroughly infiltrated by the Syrian regime [and its proxies], and without the need to delve [too much] into the political gerrymandering for which a two-thirds parliamentary vote would surely to have gotten bogged down in a pro-Syrian-dominated Parliament.

Even more significantly, the agreement was seen as having locked Hizballah into a political framework which would have inevitably lead the group to either give up its weapons and dual existence alongside the state; or use those weapons in a confrontation against the revolutionary sentiment sweeping the country, even while its prime brokers and supporters (Syria and Iran) were to come under the magnifying lens of international scrutiny.

This, mind you, after Hizballah had sought to crush (by staging the March 8th demonstrations) any Shiite empathy with: the Hariri assassination; the overall anti-occupation wave vis-a-vis the Syrians, which many Shiites with roots in the formerly Israeli-occupied South could sympathize with, and themselves had to contend with in Beirut and its southern suburbs; and the Cedar Revolution.

Of course the entire country now knows Hizballah’s response to the initiative [and others like it]: two wars, a wave of civil strife and unrest, and a complete economic shutdown (except in the weapons trade). A view of the group as being purely an Iranian-proxy and extension of the paramilitary infrastructure of that country’s theocratic autocracy would have rendered these results as self-evident. But the initiative, at least, attempted to provide the group with a mechanism to restructure itself to reflect purely Lebanese goals and agendas. It didn’t.

Another unsavoury, and at the time (as now and as will be in 2009) totally unacceptable, consequence of the alliance was the reinstatement of Nabih Berri as the Parliamentary Speaker, even as his replacement was constitutionally (don’t laugh) viable and even while some within the Cedar Revolution movement, most notably Walid Jumblatt, were calling for the removal of another Syrian lackey, then-President Emile Lahoud, through protests and other non-institutional measures. Here again, an argument for the mud of politics can be made ... but I won’t be the one to make it.

Nonetheless, and despite varied degrees of crisis and mismanagement, the mud produced by the quadripartite alliance has not totally overshadowed the fight for a sovereign Lebanon: The occupying Syrian Army has withdrawn from most of Lebanese territory; the Lebanese Army has deployed over most of that territory and has faced down a [Syrian-inspired] terrorist insurgency in Nahr el Bared; the rebuilding of Nahr el Bared has gotten under way and the camp is destined to become the first Palestinian camp on Lebanese territory to be policed by the Lebanese government and security services; Politically, draft bills for progressive parliamentary electoral laws and a law governing the reinstatement and administration of a revived Constitutional Council have been presented after the Syrian infiltration of both those institutions rendered them unviable; And internationally, the government has successfully pushed for international backing in its attempts to control its unstable borders.

The same, however, cannot be said of the piles of orange political mud and the effect they have had on the political principles of a man and a movement whom at one time it would have been inconceivable to imagine anti-Syrian bloc without, but who today, and over the past three years, have stood as the primary obstacles to that bloc’s operation ... and I’m not just talking about that miserable piece of garbage (or toilet paper) known as the MoU – tattered, as it has been, several times over by the events of this past May.

Elect-Aoun-eering –- Part II

Part I, Part II, Political Mud, The Machine

But not even that answers the question wholly. For even after the electoral results of 2005, Aoun could have gone back and been an active participant in the country's reformation in the image of the Cedar Revolution and the anti-Syrian struggle. But despite all the talk of Aoun's status as a fighter against Syrian occupation, two points have haunted the General:

1) It was, in fact, the assassination and political workings of Rafic Hariri, on an international level; along with Walid Jumblatt and the Qornet Shehwan [Christian] Gathering, organised with the blessings of the Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir; on an internal level, that had successfully ousted the Syrian regime from the country.

2) Aoun's own complicity in the devastating events which lead to his exile, the Syrian occupation, and the drafting of the Taef Accord document which he opposed and will therefore forever serve as a reminder of the destructive blunders he rendered onto the country in the early 1990s.

In continuing to block the government's formation, the game Aoun is playing is the same reactionary one as that of 2005. In effect, Aoun has no real desire to participate in this government on an executive level. Instead, the General is hoping that the formation of the government will take place in such a way as to provide him with the fuel to fire up his claim of Christian marginalization, providing him with the impetus for the protest-vote he once again hopes to reap, and garnering for the General the votes his behaviour over the last 3 years, opposed as it was to the national interests of the country's Christians, could never have given him.

That, at least, continues to be evidenced by every televised rant given by the General throughout this crisis and starting in Doha ahead of the precipitation of the government’s non-formation. The extent of this delusion, and the lengths to which Aoun intends to pursue it, are as yet unknown. Perhaps, as Ahmad Fatfat speculated several days ago, the General's logic has outlined to him a scenario in which he and his allies would obtain a two-thirds majority in the next election thereby allowing them to dismiss the recently-elected President (whom Aoun and his allies blocked for 6 months) and pushing Aoun onto the Presidential seat.

A seat from which the General could preside over the death of the International Tribunal - the undoubtable consequence of that pro-Syrian-Hizballah dominated Parliament - and allowing the General to finally witness the redemption he has so actively strived for, and cost our country so much, by erasing the legacy of the man who through his life/death brought about the end of our occupation.

And who knows, with everything going the General's way perhaps he might even be able to tackle that other persistent mark on his name, the Taef Accord - a task easily provided for, once again, by that pro-Syrian-Hizballah dominated parliament. Surely those parties would be able to find some sort of Accord more conducive to the long-term presence of their agents in all aspects of the country's political, cultural, social and military infrastructure.

As 2009 comes around, and the next Parliamentary elections with it, reality will provide a very real check to dreams of a sweeping victory for either camp. Nonetheless, the above scenario bares a chilling reminder of the consequences of a victory for the same forces that rampaged through Beirut, bombed the Mountain, and provided a valuable political cover for those violent and terroristic actions.

Whether the General will be successful in blocking the government’s formation until the 2009 elections is unclear, what is clear, however, is that if Aoun’s blustering crew do make it onto the cabinet they will most likely use their positions to engage in precisely the same nepotistic behaviour he and his followers have been so critical of [especially in reference to the late Rafic Hariri] and so guilty of engaging in themselves already.

Most likely 2009 will witness the emergence of a Presidential faction of Christian candidates more able [and perhaps more willing] to satisfy the tastes of the majority of middle of the road Christians disgusted with the Orange tsunami’s unacceptable [and frankly quite vulgar] attacks on the community’s leading prelate; his alliance and cover for a group that so obviously stands in the face of the community’s interests and long-term objectives; and the severe damage he has down to the institution of the presidency, and other institutions of the state since the return of his amicable relations with the regime that allowed him to live in a Parisian mansion for duration of those [unbearable] 15 years.

Elect-Aoun-eering -- Part I

Part I, Part II, Political Mud, The Machine

Media reports have been abuzz with news and rumors of fast-paced Hizballah moves to acquire strategic military positions throughout Lebanon. The reports, which revealed 4 (rumoured) deaths in the Jezzine area due to local resistance to Hizballah’s aggressive moves there, come in the wake of the violent campaign launched by the group on May 7th and fears that the group may be preparing for another violent confrontation between it and the Lebanese state.

While reports of Hizballah's deployments across Lebanese territory - either through their own fighters or through their proxies - continue to emerge, despite the attempted media blackout being placed on the incidents by the group, formation of the country's government and the subsequent appointment of top military and security posts continues to be hampered by Hizballah's “faux-Christian” ally, Michel Aoun.

To understand this hampering, one needs to realize that the formation of the upcoming cabinet is, as always, a cover for other issues plaguing the country. And while Hizballah’s arms, their [obvious] readiness to use them against the Lebanese population and state, and the response to that threat, as well as others, that should be derived from the country’s armed forces, constitute the main issues we are currently facing, it is the upcoming parliamentary elections that are the face of the problem driving this most recent hiccup.

Le Faux

To understand Aoun’s position on the 2009 elections, one needs to go back to the parliamentary elections of 2005 which provided Michel Aoun with two claims he has trumpeted for the past three years: his proclaimed representation of a majority of Christians in Lebanon; and his belief that the results of the 2005 elections were the result of a reactionary vote in the favour of the “Hariri-camp” following the February 14th 2005 assassination of Rafic Hariri.

On both of these claims the General is right, but not in the way that he thinks. It is true that the results of the 2005 elections were tempered by a reactionary vote, but it was a reactionary vote driven by the formation of the Quadripartite electoral alliance (composed of the Future Movement, AMAL, Hizballah, and the PSP - all pre-dominantly Muslim parties) to the detriment of the country's Christian community.

The net result of those elections, and that temporary electoral alliance, was the garnering of a massive reactionary vote by the Christian community in Aoun’s favour. This [protest] vote, bolstered as it was by the electoral bases of the SSNP and other pro-Syrian Christian groups, have provided the General with a sizeable parliamentary bloc made up of MPs from predominantly Christian districts (Metn, Jbeil and Kesrouan).

A bloc the General has used to consistently stand in the way of long-term Christian political objectives. Objectives aimed at reinforcing the state, its institutions, and the ability of those institutions to operate in the face of constant pressure by Syria and its allies, aimed at dissolving the sovereignty of the state and reinforcing the country’s status as a de facto province of its larger neighbour to the east [and north].

And so, as in any ‘analysis’ on the General and his policies, we come back to the question that has dogged Michel Aoun since his return to Lebanon: How could a man, so wholly and visibly dedicated to the fight against Syrian occupation and the instruments of that occupation – as embodied in Hizballah and its weapons, among others – have become a primary defender of those weapons and a leading instrument to the return of that occupation?

The answer to that question, I believe, has been partly given by a post, and a video, put up on this blog several months ago, detailing the circumstances of Aoun's return to Lebanon ahead of the 2005 parliamentary elections, the building of the quadripartite alliance, and Aoun's own alliance with those factions against which he - through his leadership position among the country's underground anti-Syrian resistance youth movement - had actively fought.

Progress Without Principle

(Originally posted on Blacksmiths of Lebanon)

I’ll start by saying the following: I am [mildly] optimistic. And I am undeterred by the incredible let down I first felt when reading the Arab proposal. An extended examination of the proposal, especially within the context of the events of the past week, has mustered in me a semblance of contentment with it and the reality it could create on the ground.

For one, it bears echoing the disgruntlement of my readers, my fellow bloggers, and my friends within that movement which seeks to establish for this tiny country on the Eastern Mediterranean a peace and normality to which all free Lebanese aspire. This deal stinks. On the most important of issues, it dodges the very principles on which we, the members of that movement, defined our stances.

On the Parliamentary elections, it is wrong. And perhaps out of all the issues presented here, it is the most wrong, and that because it follows down the erroneous path of talks, or political negotiations, outside the constitutional institution through which these negotiations are meant to take place – Parliament – and which has been effectively shut down by a major party [not only] to the violent assault launched against the state over the past week [but also to the assault on every institution of the state that has taken place over the past 3 years]. This path was first paved when the government agreed to National Dialogue talks [in January of 2006] the futility of which is still visible in the scars left by the July War started to abort them. It is this path that, to me, poses the greatest level of worry for the future of our state’s institutions and for the precedence that it sets.

And a worrying precedent too, is being set in the manner in which the so-called unity government is to be formed [according to the proposal] in the absence of a President and the input that that President is entitled to. In a word, the Presidential vacuum that has gripped the country over the past six months is constitutionally abnormal, unacceptable, and seemingly – to all those actually interested in pursuing a solution to this abnormality – easily fixable! After all, everyone has already supposedly agreed to who the next President should be. And for those of you [of the slower variety] who continue to cling to the resignation of this government as the sole act of salvation for this country, bear in mind that according to the constitution, the government is automatically considered resigned following the election of a President – who’s first duty it is to convene with the Parliamentary majority and all the represented parties of the country in order to form the next governing executive body (i.e. Cabinet).

Of course, we all know that what has been really happening in the country has not been the occurrence of two sides coming together to find a solution to a problem, but the occurrence of one side actively blocking the implementation of democratic norms and [instead] pursuing a policy aimed at reversing the gains garnered through the Cedar Revolution. Indeed, despite much whining about the comfort enjoyed by a Sunni PM who does not have to find compromise with a Christian President (or the ministers which answer to him in a cabinet), it is important to correctly identify which group stands to gain the most from the complete paralysis and dismantling of the institutions that define our state.

And therein lays the silver lining I have attributed to the proposal. The formation of a national unity government (assuming it to be of the non-blocking-third variety), the re-drafting of the electoral law, and the election of a President have never been M8 goals to begin with. In fact, it has been the blocking of all these that have been the goal. When Saad al Hariri, or any other M14 leader announces their objection to ‘dialogue’, it is not because they are not interested pursuing any of the above, but because they are uninterested in getting bogged down in the M8 maze of circuitous demands and two-handed dialogue aimed at impeding a solution rather than pursuing it.

By moving the talks to Doha, the capital of the most active agitator of the Iranian agenda within the Arab fold – next to Syria, that is – the Arabs and the Lebanese have in fact put the major backers of the blockages within the Lebanese system at the forefront, preventing them from hiding behind their tools in Lebanon, and exposing them to the full brunt of the failed talks. And quite a brunt there is to bear, as the international community and the petrodollar powerhouses of Gulf prepare to extract due penance for the brazen power-move by Iran in Lebanon.

If anything, the speed with which the Qatar-led Arab delegation managed to push through the blockages, on paper at least, seems indicative of the failure of that power-move and the true measure of political, economic, and military balances on the ground it has yielded. Not lightly does one declare the election of a President “within days”.

With the international tribunal due to come online within the next several weeks; with the arrival of Parliamentary elections in approximately one year and Hizballah’s complete loss of any support outside (and even, to some extent, within) its sectarian base [due to the past week’s events]; and with the group’s use of its weapons against fellow Lebanese unequivocally turning it into a militia in the eyes of an ever important [and potentially strengthened, whether directly or through UNSC 1701] UNSC 1559 – even though any mention of those weapons was left out by the Arabs’ statement – Hizballah will certainly need the time afforded by such a temporary settlement to regroup and refocus its efforts (let alone process all the intelligence gathered from the raiding of FM offices throughout Beirut).

For the Lebanese too, the implementation of this latest proposal will provide a temporary relief – time needed to organize immigration papers, explore investments abroad, and secure oneself within a sectarianly-cohesive area of the country ahead of the next wave of assaults. And that is a reality Hizballah has ensured no [realistic] proposal can reverse.

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A Pyrrhic Defeat

(Originally posted on Blacksmiths of Lebanon & Good Neighbors Blog)

For Hizballah, the prospect of exiting this most severe of crises with anything resembling a positive [let alone a victory], seems dauntingly distant. As the dust settles, Lebanon’s besieged (literally!) government remains in place, its fortitude continuously reinforced by the common disgust felt across the nation at the fact that the Iranian-backed group turned its weapons on the capital and the mountain.

In its domestic political confrontations, Hizballah’s aggressions have left it completely bankrupt. Reminding us of the obscure reason for which the country was made to pay such a heavy toll this week, a NOWLebanon editorial writes:

Even if it achieved its initial demands – that the government rescind the phone network investigation and revoke the Shqeir sacking – it would look foolish; such gains would never justify the level of violence and trauma inflicted in the last week.

Indeed. Not only do the most recent of the group’s political demands/rejections pale in comparison to the devastation wrought by its assault, but as do the feigned calls for greater government participation, a new electoral law, and a veto on the choice of the next president over which it, and its allies, paralyzed the country for over 18 months. Twice now the group has taken the country to war, and twice at times when the country’s parliamentary majority has sought to engage it over its weapons - whether through dialogue [as in the national dialogues pre-empted by the launch of the July War] or by decree [as was the case with this war].

Fully eroded are the moral dictations of the group’s humming propaganda machine in light of the gravity of the violence it has precipitated. Reports of atrocities, as a result [whether direct or indirect] of the assault, have given fuel to a deep-seated desire in the country’s populace to see their country transformed into one in which militant groups and militias have no part. And fully ridiculous have been the propaganda machine’s indictments of the weapons of residents of resisting neighborhoods, villages, and towns in light of the falling rockets, mortars, and artillery shells launched by Hizballah against them.

If you really want to laugh, consider that the noisiest indictments of the broad presence of weapons in the country have come from those parties and groups which enjoyed the most favor throughout the country’s fifteen year Syrian occupation. An occupation in which militia, paramilitary, and terrorist groups where actively maintained in order to foment the strife and discord [if it was ever needed] that could justify the presence of 40,000 Syrian occupation troops on Lebanese soil.

Indeed, many in Lebanon today believe that the pattern of violence in the country over the past three summers is part of a continuation of the Syrian strategy to incite violence and open an internationally-sanctioned path allowing a return of Syrian domination to the country – undoubtedly to restore order to the chaos started by Syria’s local co-conspirators.

Now a week into the assault, occupation, and [partial, if not superficial] delivery of its capital city back to those who should have guarded it in the first place, Lebanon is slowly reawakening to the damage inflicted on it and its institutions by an ordeal who’s end seems nowhere in sight.

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Hizballah Undressed

(Originally posted onBlacksmiths of Lebanon & Good Neighbors Blog)

By some measures, the airport-siege initiated today, and now being projected to last at least one more day, is a miscalculation - the first casualty of which is Hizballah's image ... the second may have more to do with its logistics.

Speaking to television audiences around the country and the Arab and Islamic world, Lebanon’s highest Sunni religious authority, Grand Mufti Rashid Qabbani decried the “ugly attacks carried out by Hizballah partisans”, whom Qabbani described as “armed gangs of outlaws”, calling on the Hizballah leadership to immediately withdraw them from “Sunni neighbourhoods” and warning that Lebanon’s Sunnis “had had enough”.

The Grand Mufti also pointed the finger at Iran as having a hand in today’s violence. The speech’s significance lies as much in the content as in the speaker, in that it provided the most significant drop in cover yet for a group that has continuously sought to veil its activities in the shroud of populist pan-Arabism. Instead, the Grand Mufti’s speech unveiled the group as an [Shiite] Iranian-proxy militia.

Those visualisations were reinforced by another government supporter, and leader of the [Christian] Lebanese Forces, Samir Geagea, who referred to Hizballah as the Mahdi Army in Lebanon. With the majority of Christians completely ignoring the proddings of Hizballah’s chief Christian ally (Michel Aoun) to descend into the streets, Christian areas were left relatively unaffected by the day’s violence; as were the predominately Druze towns and villages in the Chouf and Aley.

The emerging skirmishes, limited as they were to the mixed Sunni areas of Beirut into which Hizballah deployed their gunmen and goons, proved to be a very public and very explicit undressing for a group now clearly isolated and uncovered in its attacks on yet another state institution (Rafic Hariri International Airport), one named after a Sunni [Arab] patron, no less, whose assassination the Shiite group is believed [by some] to have had a hand...

...And the rest of the country’s political groups were content with sitting this one out [albeit uncomfortably] and allowing the show to continue [with the some drawing analogies between the group’s destructive actions and those of that other Arab nemesis, Israel].

Why Now?

For those interested in gauging the level of surprise felt by Hizballah when it is hit with an unexpected event, there is always a tell-tale sign: the group’s response time (after all, secure correspondences between Beirut and Tehran can create significant lags). And while Hizballah has been fast to call Walid Jumblatt names over the past week, it has failed to provide any adept response to the airport spying allegations levelled against it this week [a manifestation of the lag].

Without a doubt, Hizballah’s actions today were dictated by an urgent need to reverse the government’s decision to confront the group over its heavy security-infiltration of the country’s international airport, and its intensive spying on the movement of local and international politicians who make use of its executive runway.

And while knowledge of the security-infiltration has been no secret in the country for quite some time now, it is over the border that speculation leads us to answers as to the timing of Jumblatt’s revelations and the government’s lack of [its customary] hesitation.

In confronting the group over control of the airport, word on the street has it that the government has chosen to move at a time when cooperation between Hizballah and the controllers of that other favoured terrorist hub, the Damascus International Airport, has hit a low, presumably in the aftermath of the Mughniyeh assassination [in which inside Damascene involvement is heavily speculated].

With the possible loss (or reduced functionality) of one airport, Hizballah moved today to ensure that the group retained control over Lebanon’s airport, no matter what the cost. Hence the urgency in the group’s actions [which, while being well-rehearsed, failed to measure up to the group’s proficiency in executing, as witnessed in cases in which it has been better prepared] and the resorting to a desperate and an ultimately unsustainable siege of Beirut’s international airport.

And speaking of the costs, those may come in the form of UN Resolutions reinvigorated by Chapter 7 clauses. Already the government has moved to initiate the international protocols that would [hopefully] draw the way for a more robust international confrontation of the group. Whether that confrontation will be as effective as the government is hoping remains to be seen. In the meantime, the Lebanese will have to come to terms with the fact that Hizballah has now ensured that Shiites can no longer leave the country to avoid the fate the group has in store for them ...

... unless the Canadians send their boats again, that is.

Arab Eyes

(Originally posted on Blacksmiths of Lebanon)

In the wake of Tarek Mitri, our acting Foreign Minister’s, latest [outstanding] statements before his counterparts at the Arab League, and as the Arab world’s leaders arrive in Dakar, Senegal for the annual Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) Summit; I was reminded of another time when Mitri, the OIC, and the Arab League were linked to an effort to draw international attention to Syria’s proxy-war on the Lebanese state and its ruling Parliamentary majority.

Back then (June 2007), Mitri was busy presenting evidence of “Syria's involvement in every aspect of the ongoing terror campaign…” that ripped through the country throughout the summer of 2007. The idea was to present this concrete proof to the Arab League, to the OIC, to the UN, and to the UNSC; the objective, as was postulated then, was to garner support for effective international action to halt Syrian interference in Lebanon - such as the placement of International Monitors on our borders with Syria.

After all, when confronted with the domestic manifestations of what is a regional/international problem [Syrian and Iranian use of terrorist factions as tools of international/regional policy] we had acted – at a great national cost, no less.

And while a set of circumstances – composed of some countries’ wavering in the face of open threats by the Syrians [both verbal and practical] and a set of pressures and counter-pressures that emerged from Iranian-Saudi negotiations – prevented the achievement of the above objective then; the order in which the garnering of support proceeded is of importance, and may be at play once again.

The importance of the order lies in the need for Lebanon’s Parliamentary majority to assert both its Arab and Islamic credentials before an Arab/Islamic audience. It comes in the face of a continued propaganda campaign by Syria’s allies to paint the country’s government in the image of that other pesky neighbour of ours to the south. At no time was that image more glaring than on the screens of the Arab public’s television sets, with weekly terrorist bombings throughout Beirut and a military operation in and around a Palestinian camp. Biased reporting on the part of the Arab world’s most popular television network – which happens to be owned by a leading pusher of the Syrian/Iranian regional dossier, Qatar – drove the point home.

Today the idea continues to be to make Lebanon [or more precisely, the Lebanese government] look like Israel in the eyes of the Arab masses [Iran’s long-time target audience], and so there continues to be a need for us to pursue the defence of our sovereignty through a circuitous, and sometimes unreliable, route (this also explains our Presidential situation, somewhat).

Hopefully this time, however, with the [slow yet sure] image transformation Hizballah continues to undergo in the Arab public sphere – from Arab resistance movement to Shiite Iranian-proxy militia; with a Syrian regime exposed for its lack of intent in pursuing any compromise in Lebanon and, instead, posing a threat to other Arab states; and with even more reports on the porous nature of the Syrian-Lebanese border and the Syrian regime’s links to terror: The world will take a stand.

Putting Lebanon First: Part II

(Originally posted on Blacksmiths of Lebanon)

Oh, [Remembering] the Horror

...There is a regional conflict unfolding, and while most of us believe that "Lebanon First" is a fine notion indeed, some of us are finding it hard to see how keeping targeted Iranian weapons on our soil reaffirms that.

And yes, they are targeted and they are Iranian.

Don’t get me wrong, I would love it if Hizballah were to drop its regional affiliations/command-structure and pledge itself to the reinforcement of the Lebanese state and the bolstering of the Lebanese Army. But we all know that’s not going to happen.

After all, it’s not like it wasn’t tried before!

Recall that on the eve of the operation which catapulted our country into the July War [of 2006], representatives of the country’s various political groupings were due to hold talks on Hizballah’s integration into the Lebanese sate and Armed Forces and the establishment of a “Lebanon First” defence strategy. Before the meeting could take place, and in true “mail box” form, Nabih Berri (a staunch pro-Syrian and the Speaker of a Parliament made defunct by the threat of MP resignations and/or ‘street action’ by Hizballah [and the rest of pro-Syrian rabble] if National Dialogue talks, such as those that were being held right there and then, weren't held) postponed the meeting for a week during which the operation was launched. There has been no mention of Hizballah’s integration since.

But that was not the first time that Hizballah had clearly proven its lack of commitment/intent to wholeheartedly join in the country’s institutional framework and the political rejuvenation sweeping through in the wake the Cedar Revolution and the Syrian withdrawal.

No, that first time [for all intents and purposes] would have been on March 8th, 2005 – what I like to refer to as the official start of the [Syrian/Iranian] counter-revolution – when Hassan Nasrallah effectively took it upon himself to isolate Lebanon’s Shiite community from the national rebirth of the Independence Intifada.

But that was then. Today, on the eve of the 3 year anniversary of that horrific day, we find Hizballah vigorously engaged in scuttling the election of a (of any) Lebanese President [as such an election would reinforce the presence of a Lebanese state, thereby threatening their continued existence as the extra-institutional Iranian-proxy militia and organisation that they are].

Concessions have come and gone and our lot hasn't changed. So ahead of those celebrations of Hizballah’s first rejection of becoming [fully] Lebanese – and in light of the [not-so-strange] resemblance of the Gaza front of March 2008 to the Gaza front of June 2006 – perhaps it is best to remember Hizballah’s second (and far more violent) rejection of becoming [fully] Lebanese.

Saying that Israel is no friend of Lebanon is an understatement [if there ever was one], but believing that the only way to confront it [or just plain live with it] is by transforming our territory into a giant launching pad for Iranian rockets and keeping our land a chess board for that country's confrontations with the West is just plain dumb.

Saying that Israel is our enemy while saluting a Syrian regime which continues to target and kill Lebanese politicians, security as well as judiciary officials, and regular citizens is not only dumb but divisive and [dare I say it?] damn un-Lebanese.

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Putting Lebanon First: Part I

(Originally posted on Blacksmiths of Lebanon)

Them Be Fightin' Words

Praise are in order:

An Nahar, citing well-informed sources in Beirut, said the Lebanese delegation [at the Arab League Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Cairo] suggested pointing out its view from the Lebanon crisis in which it considered that the "major problem" was not restricted to presidential elections, but was outlined by the Syrian-Iranian intervention in Lebanon.

The delegation argued that the Syrian-Iranian meddling began by encouraging rebellion, by providing anti-government Lebanese groups with arms and by continuing to press ahead with efforts to cripple Lebanon institutions all the way to the presidential void.

The delegation, therefore, insisted that the Arabs should deal with the root of the Lebanon crisis.

At the head of that delegation, and reading out its statement calling for the Arab League’s official recognition of what is unofficially obvious to all, was Lebanon’s acting Foreign Minsiter, Tarek Mitri, who took on the Foreign Ministry portfolio following the pretend-resignation of Fawzi Salloukh in December of 2005.

I actually got a chance to meet Dr. Mitri in person, some months ago, at an AUB Alumni Event organised in Montreal. Listening to him talk during the event one had a sense of the intellectual depth and forward vision with which he approached his recent foray into public service; and the zeal he could barely contain for confronting the obstacles he and others were facing in their quest to (re)build the state.

Indeed, behind the shaggy ‘do’ and jolly demeanour, Mitri was bristling for a fight. However, his intonations on the democratic duty of a country’s citizens to uphold the institutions of the state, and work through them, as opposed to undermining them, sailed comfortably over the heads of most the audience. And when an audience member was prevented from asking a question deemed “too close to political” by an over-zealous (in more ways than one) attendant at the event, Mitri insisted that he wanted to take on political questions.

But back to the point at hand...

[Syrian Foreign Minister, Walid] Muallem hit back at Mitri, accusing the Lebanese majority of inviting U.S. warships to Lebanon in a bid to attract international interference.

Ah, the old international interference quote. You know I always found it funny that a country which had occupied us for fifteen-some years, engaged in armed conflict on our soil, and dictated what conditions should be met if we're to have elections [Presidential or Parliamentary], should complain about foreign interference on our soil (never mind the validity of the claim itself).

Oh, and lets not forget the regime’s unabashed backing of Iranian-funded groups in Lebanon (Hizballah), Palestine (Hamas), and Iraq. But lets go back to that Hizballah thing for a moment...

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Imitation Product

(Originally posted on Blacksmiths of Lebanon & Good Neighbors Blog)

...Or the use of the death of Imad Mughniyeh as a battering ram.

Writing in his latest peice, Lebanese analyst and editor, Michael Young, highlights the intense media spin campaign being waged by Syria and its allies' outlets surrounding the reported assassination of Imad Mughniyeh.

According to Young, sources close to Hizballah and Syria have sought to prepare the ground for the findings of the cooked up Syrian Tribunal [on the alleged Mughniyeh assasination] to point the finger at a list of the Syrian regime's enemies. Among those to be targetted by the campaing are the Lebanese Internal Security Forces, which last month witnessed the assassination [by Syria] of its top investigator into the Hariri assassination (and those that have followed):

...the Mughniyeh investigation may accuse "official or semi-official Lebanese parties ... allied with [the government]" of having participated in the Mughniyeh operation.

The "official or semi-official" parties the source refers to is almost certainly the Information Department of the Internal Security Forces - essentially the state security apparatus most loyal to March 14. A key objective of Syria and the [pro-Syrian Lebanese] opposition in the negotiations over a new government has been to ensure that the Interior Ministry, which oversees the Information Department, is taken out of the hands of the [anti-Syrian] parliamentary majority.

The investigation is also slated to accuse Lebanese anti-Syrian politicians allied to, and including, Walid Jumblatt and his Druze party - the PSP (according to a Syrian source highlighted in a report reviewed by Young, Jumblatt's security chief, Hisham Nasreddine, is accused of having played a role in the killing).

But if asking a question as to Jumblatt's involvement in the assassination is valid what of asking whether or not Mughniyeh was really assassinated in that car bomb. That question comes as some have speculated that Mughniyeh was in fact killed in the July War of 2006 and that by revealing his death in this manner [by assassination and after the release of Israel's Winograd Report] Hizballah would be able to sidestep any open concession of the Israelis having "scored any points". In addition, Hizballah and Syria would be able to use the man's death as currency in their fight against the anti-Syrian Parliamentary majority in Lebanon. But thats just rumor...isn't it?

Spinning the Shiites

Not so long ago there was a post on this blog about a propaganda strategy employed by Syria's allies in Lebanon which sought to "mimic and mock" the genuinely personal, creative and spontaneous drives borne of the popular Independence Intifada (a.k.a., Cedar Revolution) movement; "equating" those drives to imitation products concocted in the propaganda offices of the groups leading the Syrian-Iranian inspired counter-revolution; and finally, by doing so, erasing any national, uniting messages that underscored the original drive.

In cooking up and then spinning the Mughniyeh assassination (and the "Syrian Tribunal") as they have (and will), Syria and Hizballah are looking to apply that strategy to the assassination and [Cedar] revolution that had brought our country out from under the yoke of a Syrian occupation.

As the International Tribunal begins to pick up pace, so will the sham that will be the "Syrian Tribunal"; as evidence of the involvement of numerous Lebanese and Syrian parties - including those owing allegiance to [Shiite] Iran - rises to the surface, so will the fabrications of Lebanese and [Sunni] Arab involvement in the alleged assassination of Imad Mughniyeh; and as the calls for accountability are heaped onto those assassins in Damascus and their operatives in Lebanon, so will the calls for 'vengeance' for the 'assassination' of Mughniyeh be slung at the remaining bulwarks of the Cedar Revolution [and the civil peace of the country as a whole].

The end result will inevitably be the placement of the country's already exasperated Shiites in a direct confrontation with their countrymen. If our nation is to avoid another prolonged period of conflict, then the Shiite community must start to react to the actions and policies of a group that has cost them their lives and livelihoods in order to defend [with the blood the Lebanese] a terorrist regime in Damascus and a regional policy operated out of Tehran.

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Indecent Exposure

(Originally posted on Blacksmiths of Lebanon & Good Neighbors Blog)

For all intents and purposes, the election of Lebanon's President has been at a standstill since we last took a look at the developing candidacy of Army Commander Michel Suleiman in late November [early December] 2007. By that time, Suleiman’s angling for the Presidency (a post constitutionally unattainable to the Army Commander) had been no secret, with some of us weighing in on the possibility of his ascension since January of that year.

Of course,what none of us at that time could have predicted was that his candidacy would be carried by the Anti-Syrian Parliamentary Majority and opposed (as things continue to develop) by a Syrian regime with which he has had a historically close association.

To many Cedar Revolutionaries (present company included), the Parliamentary majority’s nomination of Suleiman to the Presidential seat remains a bitter pill to swallow. Our idea was to build a state in which “one-time” constitutional amendments would be a relic of the past [despite some of our compatriots attempts to bring that past back], and in which strong national institutions could insulate us from the regional fluctuations of an inherently [and increasingly] unstable Middle East.

We had paid for that idea with the blood of the likes of Gebran Tueni and Samir Kassir, while others, like Nassib Lahoud and Butros Harb, continued to risk their lives against a relentless killing machine. These are the men we looked to place on that Presidential seat.

But their time may still come. As things stand today, the nomination of Suleiman (back in November) as a candidate enjoying the full backing of all the Lebanese political camps has served to highlight clearly, accurately, and before an international audience the Syrian regime’s complete lack of intent in stabilising the situation in Lebanon. A quick look at the negotiations carried forth over the past three months is confirmation of that.

That clarity has helped to encourage some to allow Syria to start feeling the heat of its associations with Iran and its destabilizing of at least one Arab country. That that heat has taken the form of a now fully funded International Tribunal is unquestionable, that it might have taken the form of a Lebanonesque assassination, is interesting.

Of course, for face-saving purposes, the Syrians will still have one more chance to allow the election of a man they would probably still have little problem dealing with. With the next presidential electoral session due to be held on the 26th [of February] in Beirut, and the Arab Summit in the “Cultural Capital of the Arab World” less than ten days from then, the Syrians will be loathe to find themselves without the leaders/representatives of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kuwait, and others [not to mention Lebanon!] sitting with them at the table - or so the Arabs' thinking goes.

Despite the threat of a public snubbing (scary!) there is likely little chance that much progress will be made on the Presidency. Thursday's bomb threat at the Kuwaiti embassy in Beirut comes as a sure sign confirmation of that - in true Syrian/Iranian style, no less.

Apart from the benefits the Syrian regime derives from keeping a post-Syrian-withdrawal-Lebanon in chaos , the lack of a Presidency will also play into the hands of the leaders of the Syrian-Iranian counter-revolution in Lebanon: Hizballah. So long as there is no President, there is no Taef and there is no state governing Lebanon's territory - leaving it room enough to operate as a fully functioning organ of the Khomeinist state.

No matter what the outcome of next week’s electoral session, however, two thing will have been exposed from this process:

Talking with the Assad regime will only result in embarrassment for the talking party (as Mr. Obama’s chief foreign policy consultant learned while in Damascus last week - and as fellow blogger Tony Badran never ceases to remind us) and instability and crisis for us;

And for all their speeches, violent protests, fake platforms and promises Syria and Iran's allies in the country can no longer claim a better Lebanon as their goal. That is something we have known for quite sometime but, even more imporantly, something this presidential crisis has finally revealed to many of their (ex)supporters.

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Political Negotiation – Syrian Style

(Originally posted on Blacksmiths of Lebanon)

As we come up on yet another "Presidential Deadline" highlighted by a "new offer" (which is in fact very old) by Syria's lapdogs in Lebanon , I thought it would be interesting [or not?] to take a look at what the past three months of "negotiation" with Syria and its allies in Lebanon has brought us.

After all, since the opening France’s fumblings in November [2007] provided the regime in Damascus, it has wasted no time in falling into a rhythm not unfamiliar to it in its dealings with those uninitiated with the autocratic regime’s ways. For every concession granted to it, the regime asked for more in return.

For brevity [and sanity's] sake, I'll skip the parts about the closures of democratic institutions and the resort to extra-institutional talks in which agreements are simply ignored - or better yet, hijacked with a war.

I'll also skip the continued assassinations and attacks, targetting both national and international security forces in the country, and aimed at derailing the candidacy of the Army Commander [since he became "too Lebanese" for the Syrians' taste], the International Tribunal [most importantly], and the international community's will to stand up to the terrorists next door.

Instead I'll start by taking the acceptance of the ascension of Army Commander Michel Suleiman [on a silver March 14th platter, no less] to the Presidency - in return for the lifting of the blockade Syria’s allies in Lebanon had imposed on the presidential electoral process - as the first concession granted in this negotiating process [remember, that was back in late November].

In return for this reversal of the M14 mantra ["no to an amendment"], the regime’s answer was to instruct its servile allies to object to the election unless the Parliamentary majority was [also] stripped of its executive powers in Cabinet – a goal the Syrian assassination machine was unable to secure despite their repeated attempts.

This demand was in turn met with a concession on the number of ministers allotted to the Parliamentary Majority: in a thirty-member Cabinet the majority would retain 14 seats while 6 seats would be appointed by the President and 10 by Syria’s allies in the [so-called] Opposition. With less than half of all Cabinet seats, the parliamentary majority would therefore be unable to exercise any executive authority without first obtaining the approval of the Syrian-backed Opposition or a President whose appointment was itself a concession to the regime.

Predictably, that offer – which had managed to formulate itself in the form of an Arab League initiative and which enjoys the support of a wide Christian base [due to that community’s view of Suleiman as a potentially “strong” President] – was met with a further demand that the Parliamentary majority be stripped even of its symbolic majority status in Cabinet and that an allocation of cabinet seats be apportioned according to a 10-10-10 scheme. Who needs democracy and elections anyway?

In addition, Syria [through its allies in Lebanon] would also require prior approval of any and all major security appointments to be made under the new President and Cabinet.

This last bit reminded me of our own Benedict Aounald's last utterances [at the behest of his sugar-daddy Nasrallah and the assassins they answer to in Damascus and Tehran] before he got slapped with the nomination of another Maronite Christian General with something more to offer his constituency than the erosion of their political presence - although that (really) remains to be seen.

Of course, if Syria doesn't like the security appointees, the new ministers, or the new President it can always kill them - what? its not like they haven't done it before! But that is beside the point...or is it the main point?

Addendum: A few hours after this post was put up Syria's spokesmen in Beirut came out with their latest obstructionist demand: the ministers appointed by the President, along the 10-10-10 scheme, should not be able to vote in the cabinet. Brilliant!

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